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Abstract 
This study addresses a question that has not been researched much previously, namely, does the 
unavailability of health insurance act as an incentive for persons to enlist in the military in the U.S.? This 
relationship is proffered as the “Military Health Care Magnet Hypothesis.”  The present study endeavors to 
provide insight into this issue within a cost-benefit framework. The empirical analysis uses annual data for 
the years 1974 through 2007, the only years to date for which all of the variables in the model are 
dependable after the end of military conscription in the U.S. in 1973. Both OLS and 2SLS results 
demonstrate, among other things, that the greater the percentage of the civilian population without health 
insurance, the greater the rate of enlistment in the U.S. Army. 
Keywords: Military enlistment, Health insurance unavailability, Cost-benefit model 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, various dimensions of the health care industry have attracted considerable attention. The 
topics debated range from hospital costs, profitability, and efficiency issues to medical malpractice to 
physician staffing to the health care inflation rate (Chirikos, 1998-99; Daniels and Gatsonis, 1999; Given, 
1996; Glied, 2003; Goodman and Stano, 2000; Hart et al., 1997; Jordan, 2001; Karsten, 1995; Koch, 1992; 
Okunade, 2001, 2003; Olsen, 1996).One of the most important and contentious issues in U.S. healthcare 
that has received the greatest increase in attention in recent years is health insurance coverage (Bharmal 
and Thomas, 2005; Bundorf and Pauly, 2002; Cebula, 2006; Dushi and Honig, 2003; Frick and Bopp, 2005; 
Gruber, 2003; Harris and Keane, 1999; Holahan et al, 2003; Kronick and Gilmer, 2002; Marstellar et al, 
1998; de Meza, 1983; Newhouse, 1994; Nyman, 2003; Swartz, 2001; 2003).  
  
This tremendous scrutiny and debate can be attributed to several reasons. Presumably, as argued in Dushi 
and Honig (2003, p. 252), at least part of this increased attention can be attributed to the fact that there has 
been a noticeable decline in health insurance coverage over the last two decades. Indeed, over a decade ago, 
Cutler (1994, p. 20) had observed that “About 15 percent of the population…are uninsured.”  More recently, 
for the year 2003, Bharmal and Thomas (2005, p. 643) observe that the number of uninsured reached 43.6 
million or 17.3 percent of persons under the age of 65. Even more recently, Frick and Bopp (2005) also 
emphasize that 17 percent of this population is without health insurance.  
To provide perspective, “economic” concerns can in effect largely be categorized into those relating to 
efficiency issues and those relating to equity issues. The topic of the percent of the population without 
health insurance effectively falls into both of these categories. From a purely financial perspective, those 
persons without health insurance create an efficiency problem in that the healthcare system must, in the 
final analysis, “balance its books,” i.e., payments for the uninsured must somehow be made. At issue is the 
efficiency/equity question of having those with private insurance and/or some other entity (be it 
government, taxpayers in general, or other source of funds) pay for the medical care of those without health 
insurance. From the perspective of medical care per se, one provocative issue is whether or not those 
without health insurance receive the same quality and quantity of medical care as those with health 
insurance. It could be argued that those without health insurance should not receive the same level and 
quality of medical care because their revealed preference/demand for health insurance is lower and 
therefore they value health care at a lower level than the medically insured do. This argument might seem 
substantive if in fact not having health insurance merely reflected health insurance preferences as opposed 
to limited purchasing power/income and/or other constraints to obtaining health insurance. For whatever 
reason, the percent of the U.S. population without health insurance is an issue of considerable political 
interest, as evidenced by the major health care reform pursued by the Obama administration in 2009. 
The present study seeks to provide at least preliminary insights into a very different dimension of the 
overall health insurance issue. In particular, this study empirically investigates what is proffered here as the 
“Military Health Care Magnet Hypothesis.” In particular, this study hypothesizes that the greater the 
percentage of the civilian population that is without health insurance, the greater the incentive at the margin 
for civilians to enlist in the U.S. military, ceteris paribus. In the interest of relevance, the study period runs 
from 1974 through 2007, thereby beginning with the first full year after the end of military conscription 
(the “draft”) in the U.S. and controls for the Gulf War of 1990 and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. We 
adopt a cost-benefit framework to empirically test this hypothesis. We include as independent variables 
factors such as the percent of the civilian population without health insurance, measures of real income 
growth in the U.S., the percent of the population with a “veteran” status, the risks associated with military 
service during ongoing military conflicts, and other factors that are relevant to the enlistment decision 
process. Both OLS and 2SLS results provide considerable support for the central health care 
insurance/enlistment hypothesis. 
2. Review of Related Literature 
Before providing the framework and results of the present study, we review briefly some of the recent 
published literature on health insurance coverage determinants on the one hand and on military enlistment 
determinants on the other hand. Beginning with the former, the following observation by Swartz (2003) is 
relevant. In particular, Swartz (2003, p. 283) makes the observation that, simply put, many of those who do 
not have health insurance “…simply cannot afford to purchase it…” Swartz (2003, p. 283) proceeds to 
observe that many households “…cannot afford to purchase health insurance unless it is heavily 
subsidized.” Swartz (2003, p. 283) also claims that most of those households that “…do not have access to 
employer-sponsored coverage…must purchase…health insurance in the non-group [individual] 
market…where insurance is typically twice as expensive [to the household] as employer-group 
coverage…,” where the likelihood of purchasing health insurance is lower than otherwise (because of “the 
law of demand”).   
In the study by Dushi and Honig ( 2003), the focus involving healthcare insurance is rather different. In 
particular, in Table 1 of their study, Dushi and Honig (2003, p. 253) provide evidence on gender 
differences in the propensity to purchase group health insurance when the latter is available. Their data 
reveal that, overall, females in the labor force tend to have a lower “take-up” rate than males in terms of 
health insurance plans: 73 percent of the time for females versus 88 percent of the time for males. Dushi 
and Honig (2003) argue that some significant portion of this male-female take-up disparity is attributable to 
married women opting to rely on a spouse’s health insurance plan. This male-female take-up disparity 
notwithstanding, when a health insurance plan is available through the employer, nearly three-fourths of the 
time women do take advantage of the option. Moreover, the presence of labor unions appears to increase 
health insurance availability.      
Newhouse (1994) approaches the question regarding the propensity of the elderly to purchase health 
insurance from a different perspective. He observes that that most of the U.S. population age 65 and older 
are covered by Medicare. He also stresses that as a person advances in years, so does the incidence of 
health problems. Given the limitations on Medicare coverage, Newhouse (1994, p. 7) observes that many 
elderly persons regard Medicare coverage as insufficient to meet their needs. Indeed, apparently because of 
the latter consideration, Newhouse (1994, p. 7) finds that “…over 80 percent of Medicare 
beneficiaries…had some form of supplemental health insurance, with a third having individually purchased 
insurance.” 
The study by Frick and Bopp (2005) is concerned with the fact that between 15 and 20 percent of the U.S. 
population do not have health insurance. Frick and Bopp  (2005) observe that the classic utility-insurance 
model makes it patently clear that having a very low income can seriously restrict the ability to purchase 
health insurance. The Frick and Bopp (2005) study not only focuses on the effects of poverty on health 
insurance purchases but also on other factors. Frick and Bopp (2005) deals with pooled cross-sectional/time 
series data, with the empirical estimation process revealing the following: the percent of the population 
without health insurance is an increasing function of the percent of the population whose income lies below 
the poverty level, the percent of the population that is female, and the percent of the population with only a 
high school diploma, with the first of these three variables being the most dominant. 
Finally, the study by Cebula (2006) uses an aggregate state-level cross-section data set to examine the 
percent of the population without health insurance in the year 2000, and includes as an explanatory variable 
a measure of the effects of being either self employed or an independent contractor. The most interesting 
finding is that the percent of the population without health insurance is an increasing function of the percent 
of the population that is either self employed or independent contractors. The study also concludes that the 
percent of the population without health insurance is a decreasing function of median family income and 
the percent of the population age 65 and older and an increasing function of the percent of the population 
that is Hispanic. Thus, a basic conclusion found in the Cebula (2006) study involves the inability of people 
to afford health insurance, as found in Frick and Bopp (2005). 
The political basis and economics of the military draft and the subsequent formation of the AVMF (all-
volunteer military force) are set forth in a series of  insightful, original studies by Tollison (1970) and by 
Tollison, Amacher, Miller, Pauly, and Willett (1973). Beyond the scope of these studies, Seeborg (1994) 
conducted a provocative study based on data derived from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, in 
which he concluded that the probability of enlistment is directly related to minority and poverty status, 
while controlling for ability and a number of other socioeconomic background variables. In addition, the 
Seeborg (1994) analysis of poverty “transitions” shows that a very large percentage of enlistees in the early 
1980s who were living in poverty at age 17 had escaped poverty by 1990, i.e., that the military can serve as 
a mechanism for upward economic mobility for disadvantaged youth. 
Segal, Bachman, and O’Malley (1999) study the differences in the propensity to enlist of various subgroups 
of potential enlistees into the U.S Military. The analysis furthers the idea that black youth regard the 
military as a vehicle for upward social and economic mobility. Hence black youth are more likely to enlist 
in the military compared to white youth. Furthermore the presence of a military parent, military 
grandparent or a military sibling within the family increases the propensity of a potential enlistee to enlist. 
This is consistent at least in principle with recent studies such as Kleykamp (2006) and Cebula, Menon, and 
Menon (2008), that find the institutional and cultural presence of the military within an area has a 
significant influence on enlistment decisions. 
Warner, Simon, and Payne (2003) conclude that civilian job opportunities are the key consideration for 
high school graduates when pondering the decision to enlist. Although post high school educational 
opportunities and access played a role in such a decision, it was the overall economic opportunity available 
that was the most significant factor in an enlistment decision, especially among rural youth. 
A very relevant recent study by Kleykamp (2006) highlights three areas of influence on military enlistment: 
individual educational goals; the institutional presence of the military in communities (as observed above); 
and race and socioeconomic status. The study was conducted in the state of Texas and based on individual 
survey data. The study analyses the relative risk ratios associated with each choice made by a potential 
enlistee.  
Lastly, a study by Cebula, Menon, and Menon (2008) provides panel least squares (PLS) evidence at the 
state level for factors influencing military enlistment. This study deals with data for the 2003 through 2005 
period and finds that, consistent with Kleykamp (2006) and Segal, Bachman, and O’Malley (1999), the 
stronger the institutional and cultural presence of the military within an area, the greater the proportion of 
the age-eligible population that enlists in the military. Furthermore, Cebula, Menon, and Menon (2008) also 
find that the greater the opportunity costs to military enlistment, the lower the enlistment rate, a finding 
consistent with Warner, Simon, and Payne (2003), as well as Seeborg (1994). Moreover, this study also 
finds a higher casualty rate as discouraging military enlistment.  
Our review of the literature indicates that the lack of health care coverage reflects substantially the inability 
of the people to afford healthcare costs.  The military could serve as an avenue to improve one’s socio-
economic status, especially when the opportunity cost is low and alternate opportunities are scarce.  One 
important way in which the military could contribute to an individual’s well being is by providing health 
care.  Hence the argument that in an era of rising heath care costs access to health care through the military 
could provide an important incentive to enlist.  The flip side of this issue is also poses an interesting 
question:  If our hypothesis were indeed to be true, how would universal health care coverage impact 
military enlistment? 
3. The Basic Framework  
The basic framework adopted in this study focuses on the decision to enlist in the U.S military as a cost-
benefit decision. In particular, the decision to enlist in the military, Denlist, is predicated upon the expected 
net benefits of enlistment, ENBenlist. The latter is  treated as an increasing function of  the expected gross 
benefits of enlistment, EGBenlist, and a decreasing function of the expected gross costs of enlistment, 
EGCenlist, such that: 
ENBenlist = f(EGBenlist, EGCenlist), DenlistEGBenlist > 0, DenlistEGCenlist < 0   (1) 
Naturally, as evidenced in the studies referenced in the literature review above, there are a number of 
variables that typically are expected to exercise an influence over enlistment rates. To begin addressing 
these, the first focus is on the EGBenlist, where: 
 EGBenlist  = g (economic benefits, Family/Cultural benefits)   (2) 
The central hypothesis being empirically tested in this study is that the greater the percentage of the 
population without health insurance [UNINS], the greater the propensity to enlist [ENLIST] in the U.S. 
military, ceteris paribus. This hypothesis, dubbed here as the Military Health Care Magnet Hypothesis, is 
based fundamentally on the fact that those enlisted in the U.S. armed forces, along with their immediate 
families (spouse, children) receive free medical care provided through the military.  Given the increased 
proportion of the U.S. population without health insurance since 1974, free medical care provided by the 
armed forces should act as an attraction/incentive to potential enlistees, i.e., increase the EGBenlist. 
Alternatively stated, the expected economic benefits associated with enlistment are expected to be greater 
the higher the percentage of the population without health insurance (UNINS), ceteris paribus. This is 
because enlistment brings with it health care without any health insurance premiums. Thus, the higher the 
percentage of the population without health insurance, the greater the EGBenlist level.  
In addition, the “family/cultural benefits” of enlistment are expected to be greater in an environment which 
has a higher presence of persons who are military veterans (Kleykamp, 2006; Segal, Bachman, and 
O’Malley, 1999; Cebula, Menon, and Menon, 2008). This is because enlistment is viewed as a socially 
approved and admired behavior and presumably receives positive psychological reinforcement, 
encouragement, and social approval in environments with a higher percentage of the population being 
veterans (PVET). Thus, the family/cultural benefits from enlistment are an increasing of PVET, ceteris 
paribus.  
Hence, (2) initially becomes: 
EGBenlist  = g (UNINS, PVET), gUNINS > 0, gPVET > 0    (3)     
The level of EGCenlist is expected to be an increasing function of opportunity costs of enlistment. These 
opportunity costs can be measured by potential economic opportunities from non-enlistment sources, 
measured here in the broad sense by the percentage growth rate of real GDP, GRRGDP. Accordingly, in 
principle paralleling Warner, Simon and Payne (2003) and Cebula, Menon, and Menon (2008), based on 
opportunity-cost reasoning, it is hypothesized that EGCenlist is an increasing function of GRRGDP, ceteris 
paribus.  
Furthermore, it is also expected that risk-averse behavior would treat a greater degree of risk in the form of 
the greater probability of being seriously wounded or a fatality under wartime conditions, namely, in the 
Gulf War of 1990, the War in Afghanistan, and in Operation Iraqi Freedom, WARRISK, as elevating 
EGCenlist, ceteris paribus (Cebula, Menon, and Menon, 2008). Hence, the EGCenlist is initially expressed as: 
EGCenlist = h (GRRGDP, WARRISK), hGRRGDP > 0, hWARRISK >0   (4) 
  
Substituting from (3) and (4) into (1) yields the following: 
ENBenlist = f (UNINS, PVET, GRRGDP, WARRISK), 
fUNINS > 0, fPVET > 0, fGRRGDP < 0, fWARRISK < 0        (5)         
4. The Empirical Analysis 
      
Based on the model expressed in (5), the following model is to be estimated initially: 
ARMYRECRt = a0 + a1 UNINSt-1 + a2 PVETt-1 + a3 GRRGDPt-1 + a4 WARRISKt +          (6) 
where (data sources in parentheses):   
ARMYRECRt = the number of army recruits in year t, as a percentage of the U.S. population in year t 
(National Priorities Project Database, 2008); 
a0 = constant;  
UNINSt-1 = percentage of the civilian U.S. population without health insurance coverage in year t-1 (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 1976; 1978; 1980; 1984; 1987; 1990; 1994; 1996; 1998; 2001; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 
2008; 2009);  
PVETt-1 = the percentage of the U.S. population who have served in the U.S. military as of year t-1  
(Congressional Research Service, 2008; Council of Economic Advisors, 2009, Table B-34); 
GRRGDPt-1 = the percentage growth rate of real GDP (expressed in year 2000 dollars) over year t-1 
(Council of Economics Advisors, 2009, Table B-4);  
WARRISKt = a binary dummy variable =1 for the year 1990 (first Gulf War) and the years of the Wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq; and 
 = stochastic error term. 
The study period runs from 1974 through 2007. Basic descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1. The 
ADF and PP unit roots tests reveal that three of the variables in this initial specification are not stationary in 
levels: one (ARMYRECR) is stationary only in first differences; one (UNINS) is stationary in only second 
differences; and one (PVET) is stationary in levels but with a trend variable. The variable GRRGDP is 
stationary in levels.  The ADF and PP results are provided in Table 2. Accordingly, in the estimate of 
equation (6), ARMYRECR is expressed in first differences, UNINS is expressed in second differences, and 
a TREND variable is included. The data deals with total annual number of army recruits in the US, hence it 
is not possible to distinguish by gender or race at the aggregate level. 
Table 3, column (a) provides the results for our baseline model. We find that all four of the estimated 
coefficients exhibit the hypothesized signs, with three statistically significant at the one percent level and 
one statistically significant at five percent level. In addition, the TREND variable is statistically significant 
at the one percent level.i The estimated coefficient on the PVET variable is positive (as expected) and 
statistically significant at the three percent level, implying that an environment where there is a greater 
concentration of veterans is conducive to a greater propensity to enlist in the U.S. Army (Segal, Bachman, 
and O’Malley, 1999; Kleykamp, 2006; Cebula, Menon, and Menon, 2008). Consistent in principle with 
Seeborg (1999) Warner, Simon, and Payne (2003), and Cebula, Menon, and Menon (2008), the estimated 
coefficient on the GRRGDP variable is negative and statistically significant at the one percent level. This 
finding implies that the stronger the growth rate of the economy, the higher the opportunity costs of 
enlistment and the lower the net benefits thereof and hence the lower the rate of enlistment. Next, the 
coefficient on the WARRISK variable is negative and statistically significant at the one percent level. The 
latter finding implies that volunteers for U.S. Army duty are deterred from enlisting during actual war-time 
conditions, presumably because of the perceived higher risks of being either seriously wounded or killed in 
military engagements (Cebula, Menon, and Menon, 2008). 
Finally, there is the finding for the key health care variable. The estimated coefficient on the variable 
UNINS is positive and statistically significant at the one percent level, implying that the greater the percent 
of the civilian population without health insurance, the greater the propensity for eligible young men and 
women to enlist in the U.S. Army. Thus, this result provides strong empirical support for the “Military 
Health Care Magnet Hypothesis.”        
We test for the robustness of our baseline model with three alternate specifications, the results of which are 
reported in columns (b), (c) and (d) of Table 3. We include the following additional variables in these 
specifications (data source in parentheses): 
POPPRESt-1 = the Presidential job approval rating in year t-1, an index that ranges from 
0 to 100 (Gallup Poll, 2008); 
TERRORt = a binary variable for the terrorist attach of September 11th : TERRORt = 1 for the year 2001 
and = 0 otherwise; 
COLLEGEt-1 = percentage of the adult population age 25 and older with at least a bachelors degree in year 
t-1 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1976; 1978; 1980; 1984; 1987; 1990; 1994; 1996; 1998; 2001; 2003; 2004; 2005; 
2006; 2008; 2009). 
If a given U.S. President is very popular, his policies, including actual or potential military policies, may 
attract enlistees who “believe” in his cause. Alternatively, under certain conditions, even if temporary, there 
may be expected benefits from enlistment if a potential enlistee experiences or expects to experience 
greater self esteem from serving his/her country. For example, after the terrorist attacks on U.S. soil on 
September 11th of 2001, a surge of patriotism seemingly swept across the nation and at some level united 
Americans. Thus, the experience of terrorism on September 11th of 2001 (TERROR) and the manifestation 
of a popular President (POPPRES) each may act to increase the expected benefits of enlistment, ceteris 
paribus.  Finally, the greater one’s educational attainment, the greater one’s labor force options. Hence, the 
greater proportion of the population with a college degree, the less appealing military enlistment will be 
(Seeborg, 1999: Warner, Simon, and Payne, 2003), ceteris paribus.  
In Table 3, column (b), the variable POPPRES is included in the model; in column (c), the variables 
POPPRES and TERROR are included in the model; finally, in column (d), all three of the additional 
variables [POPPRES, TERROR, and COLLEGE] are included the model. In all three columns, the 
estimated coefficients on these additional variables fail to be statistically significant at even the ten percent 
level. On the other hand, the estimated coefficients on the four basic explanatory variables, UNINS, PVET, 
GRRGDP, and WARRISK continue to exhibit their expected signs; furthermore, nine of these 12 
coefficients are statistically significant at the one percent level, one is statistically significant at the five 
percent level, and the remaining two are statistically significant at approximately the six percent level. Thus, 
there appears to be strong evidence that the Army recruitment rate is an increasing function of the PVET 
variable and a decreasing function of the GRRGDP and WARRISK variables. This conclusion is 
strengthened by the fact that the coefficient on the UNINS variable is positive and statistically significant at 
the one percent level in all three estimates.      
As an additional robustness check, we also consider the possibility that there is no reason to expect that 
there exists a significant time lag between the influence of either (a) the presence a military parent, military 
grandparent, and/or a military sibling or (b) a stronger institutional and cultural presence of the military on 
the one hand and the decision to enlist in the Army on the other hand (Segal, Bachman, and O’Malley, 
1999; Kleykamp, 2006; Cebula, Menon, and Menon, 2008). Thus, the analysis now investigates the 
Military Health Care Magnet Hypothesis under the condition that ARMYRECR and PVET are 
contemporaneous. 
Given that ARMYRECR and PVET are being treated as contemporaneous, the possibility of simultaneity 
bias arises. Accordingly, the analysis undertakes a 2SLS (two-stage least squares) estimation, with the 
instrumental variable being the two-year lag of the unemployment rate of the civilian labor force, URt-2 
(Council of Economic Advisors, 2009, Table B-42). This variable was the instrument of choice because (a) 
URt-2 is highly correlated with PVETt and (b) URt-2 is also not correlated with the error terms in the system. 
The following equation is now estimated by 2SLS with the Newey-West (1987) heteroskedasticity 
correction:  
ARMYRECRt = b0 + b1 UNINSt-1 + b2 PVETt + b3 GRRGDPt-1 + b4 WARRISKt + ’ (8) 
The results are presented in Table 3, column (e); all four of the estimated coefficients exhibit the expected 
signs and are statistically significant at the one percent level. The DW and Rho statistics imply the absence 
of any serious autocorrelation problems. Finally, the F-statistic is statistically significant at the one percent 
level, attesting to the overall strength of the model. 
Thus, it can be reasonably inferred that the U.S. Army enlistment rate is positively impacted by a stronger 
institutional and cultural presence of the military (Segal, Bachman, and O’Malley, 1999; Kleykamp, 2006; 
Cebula, Menon, and Menon, 2008). In addition, the greater the growth rate of real GDP, the lower the 
enlistment rate (Seeborg,  1999; Warner, Simon, and Payne, 2003; and Cebula, Menon, and Menon (2008). 
Furthermore, it can be inferred that wartime conditions and the associated greater expected risk of being 
seriously wounded or killed create a disincentive to enlist (Cebula, Menon, and Menon, 2008). Finally, the 
coefficient on the health insurance variable is positive and highly statistically significant, implying strong 
support for the “Military Health Care Magnet Hypothesis.” Clearly, these 2SLS findings are all consistent 
with the OLS findings.  
5. Conclusion 
This study addresses the following question: “Does the unavailability of health insurance act as a incentive 
for persons to enlist in the military?” Within a cost-benefit framework, the present study endeavors to 
provide insight into this issue, referred to here as the “Military Health Care Magnet Hypothesis”. The OLS 
and 2SLS results provide substantial evidence that the greater the percentage of the civilian population 
without health insurance, the greater the rate of enlistment in the U.S. Army. Voluntary enlistment in the 
U.S. Army also is positively impacted by a greater presence of military veterans (which “promotes” 
enlistment). Furthermore, it is negatively impacted by a more rapidly growing economy (a proxy for higher 
opportunity costs) and military conflicts/wars (risk-averse behavior with military conflict being a risk factor 
that elevates the expected probability of being wounded or killed).  Thus, the AVMF (all-voluntary military 
force) market appears to function as the free enterprise system would expect. 
Finally, it may be worthy of note that if the “Military Health Care Magnet Hypothesis” is valid, then it 
logically follows that if a system of de facto universal health care is in fact instituted in the U.S., there may 
be unforeseen externalities from a military recruitment perspective. In particular, implementation of 
universal health care would naturally result in a decline in the expected gross benefits of enlistment. This is 
because would-be enlistees will factor the same into their cost-benefit analysis of whether to enlist. Clearly, 
as the AVMF market factors the availability of universal health care outside the confines of the military 
into its marginal enlistment decision calculus, for many the expected net benefits (of enlisting) will decline 
sufficiently as to create a no-enlist decision. In turn, it follows that some form of additional incentives will 
be needed in order to induce sufficient recruitment/enlistment. We contribute to the debate on universal 
health care coverage by pointing out the possibility for an unintended consequence, namely a decline in 
military enlistment. Thus if universal health care is instituted, it could increase the cost of military 
recruitment in the future. 
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Table 1. Basic Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation 
ARMRECR  0.01639          0.0516 
UNINS                14.604  1.0106 
PVET   0.0438  0.000154 
GRRGDP  2.9333  1.911349 
WARRISK  0.2083  0.414851 
POPPRES  56.166  10.02461  
TERROR  0.041  0.204 
COLLEGE  22.29  3.35 
UR   6.1615  1.383 
 
Table 2. ADF and PP Unit Root Test Results 
  ADF, PP AD, PP                  ADF, PP     ADF, PP 
Variable Level        Level Plus Trend   First Differences     Second Differences  
ARMRECR -1.53, -1.49 -2.39, -2.32 -4.18*, -4.12*  -------  
UNINS               -1.65, -1.62 -2.03, -1.99 -2.59. -2.54  -4.15*, -3.99* 
PVET  -1.98, -1.88 -4.02*, -3.79* -------   ------- 
GRRGDP -4.01*, -5.65* -------  -------   ------- 
POPPRES -3.54*, -3.48* -------  -------   ------- 
COLLEGE -1.29, -1.27 -1.45, -1.42 -2.32, -2.22  -5.76*, -5.16* 
*Critical value for rejection of null hypothesis at 95 percent confidence level = -2.89. 
 
Table 3. Estimation Results for ARMYRECR 
Variable  (a) (b) ( c) (d) (e) 2SLS 
      
Constant -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 
  ∆∆UNINS 
0.0005**
* 
0.0005**
* 
0.0005**
* 0.0005*** 
0.0006**
* 
 (3.5) (3.52) (3.53) (3.04) (4.02) 
PVET 0.54*** 0.679** 0.691* 0.679* 1.15*** 
 (2.42) (2.16) (2.08) (2.01) (2.70) 
GRRGDP -0.0003 -0003*** -0.0003** -0.0003*** 
-
0.0003**
* 
 (-4.20) (-3.98) (-3.93) (-3.70) (-3.62) 
WARRISK -0.028 -0.03*** -0.031*** -0.0315*** 
-
0.0275**
* 
 (-4.63) (-4.33) (-4.18) (-4.10) (-3.21) 
POPPRES ------- 0.00003 0.00004 0.00003 
0.0001**
* 
  (1.16) (1.15) (-0.8) (3.61) 
TERROR ------- ------- -0.0004 -0.0004  
   (-0.84) (-0.68)  
  
COLLEGE ------- ------- ------- -0.0003  
    (-0.31)  
TREND 0.0001 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001***  
* * 
 (4.01) (-4.19) -3.9 -4.01  
      
DW 2.23 2.25 2.31 2.26 2.20 
Rho -0.12 -0.13 -0.16 -0.13 -0.10 
R2 0.60 0.63 0.63 0.64  
AdjR2 0.49 0.49 0.46 0.45  
F 5.17 4.54*** 3.68** 3.05** 6.25*** 
 
Terms in parentheses are t-values.  is the first differences operator;   
 is the second differences operator.  
***indicates statistically significant at one percent level.  
**indicates statistically significant at five percent level. 
*indicates statistically significant at ten percent level. 
                                                 
 
